;

 

;

Higher frequency of GPS/GNSS interference across Pomerania in August 2026

Press release from Blue Dot Solutions.

Gdansk, September 25, 2026. GNSS/GPS signal interference is already an everyday occurrence for the residents of the Polish region of Pomerania. Due to the close proximity of the Russian Kaliningrad Oblast and the ever-escalating geopolitical situation, our region is exposed to relentless, deliberate GNSS/GPS signal jamming.

Nowadays, no one is surprised in Pomerania to see a periodically malfunctioning "GPS on the phone" or problems renting a city bike. The scale of the problem is of course much wider and it affects various digital systems and services.

GNSS/GPS signal jamming does not subside

Blue Dot Solutions, a space sector company from Gdansk, continuously monitors the GNSS environment since early May 2026 in the region of Pomerania. Since that time the scale and range of GNSS interferences has risen significantly.

In August 2026, the station network detected a total of 50 GPS/GNSS signal jamming incidents, which collectively lasted 302 hours and 58 minutes, corresponding to nearly 41% of the entire month's time. According to the findings of the Blue Dot Solutions team, the interference time in July was 90.5 hours. In just one month, the interference time more than tripled!  

Of all the interferences, 40% covered only the L1 band. This is the primary band used in satellite navigation, serving for basic measurements. Much fewer attacks - 14% - were directed against the L2 band. This band is wider than the basic L1. It is used, among others, in precise phase measurements or in the PPP (Precise Point Positioning) measurement technique. The most dangerous attacks include those directed against two bands at once. The stations detected 23 such attacks, which corresponds to 46% of all attacks.

Out of all cases of GNSS signal jamming, 17 events were classified as confirmed, with a total time of 100 hours and 24 minutes (over 13% of the total month's time). 33 events were considered probable, lasting a total of 202 hours and 34 minutes (over 27% of the entire month's time). In summary, these events collectively lasted the aforementioned 302 hours and 58 minutes.

Diagram 1: Hourly overview of GPS/GNSS interference in August 2026. The red color indicates very strong interferences, which we define as confirmed, while the blue color indicates relatively weaker ones, defined as probable.

Unlike in previous months, in August 2026, GPS/GNSS signal reception interferences occurred in Pomerania at all times of the day and night, as shown in Diagram 1. The length and intensity of the interference also increased, as shown in Chart 1.

 

Chart 1: Summary of the total GPS/GNSS signal jamming detection time in Pomerania in the June-July-August 2026 period. On the Y-axis - hours, on the X-axis - month.

Attacks are becoming more serious

Deliberate GNSS signal interferences are already a permanent element of hybrid warfare. The least serious but common problems associated with this include falling drones, buses losing their locations, and rental bikes "appearing" in the waters of the Baltic Sea, which we have reported on multiple times. More serious threats include incidents related to incorrect positions provided by receivers mounted on ships, elements of critical infrastructure, or specialized equipment responsible for our safety.

An example of such an incident was described in August by the “Gospodarka Morska” portal. This service reported that the Polish ORP Albatros vessel experienced problems related to GPS/GNSS signal jamming on August 21 during operations on the Baltic Sea. The interferences from that day are confirmed by the Blue Dot Solutions system [see Chart 2].

Chart 2: GPS/GNSS signal jamming incident on the L1 band on August 21, 2026, based on data from the Blue Dot Solutions station. The blue color indicates the noise level occurring on the L1 band, while the red color indicates the level of continuous wave suppression on this band. Clear continuous wave suppression means the jamming of a weak satellite signal by a stronger source.

About Blue Dot Solutions

Blue Dot Solutions focuses on the practical processing of satellite data, in particular Earth observation and GPS/GNSS positioning. The company implements projects within the European Space Agency (ESA), European Horizon programs, and of a commercial nature. Currently, Blue Dot Solutions is introducing two solutions to the market: Canola EO - observations for agriculture based on SAR satellite data, and PLUTONIC - an alternative access to time.

 July 2026 - GPS signal disruptions are ongoing in Pomerania

July 2026 - GPS

signal disruptions

are ongoing

in Pomerania

Press release from Blue Dot Solutions.
Gdańsk, August 11, 2026. GPS/GNSS signal disruptions continue in Pomerania. In July 2026, disruptions occurred for at least 90 hours, affecting the operation of many systems in this region of Poland.
Satellite navigation has become so common that we don’t even notice how often we use it. GPS - or, more broadly, GNSS - allows us to plot a route from point A to point B, track a food delivery driver, or find the nearest electric scooter.
GNSS systems are also used in more advanced solutions, particularly in applications where operations are carried out without direct human intervention.
Although GNSS receivers are so widely used, they remain vulnerable to jamming and spoofing attacks. A single powerful attack can disrupt the operation of many independent systems. Our country has been experiencing this for several years, particularly in its northern and northeastern regions. The war in Ukraine, the tense geopolitical situation between Europe, Russia, and Belarus, and the close proximity to the Kaliningrad Oblast only facilitate attacks on GNSS infrastructure.
Falling drones or incorrect location data displayed on a phone are just a few examples of how attacks on GNSS affect everyday life. Deliberate attacks on GNSS by neighboring countries force local entities to respond.
Monitoring stations in Gdańsk
In response to such attacks, in May 2026, the Gdańsk-based technology company Blue Dot Solutions began work on implementing a network of stations to monitor GPS/GNSS signals. The first experimental station was set up that same month. Then, in June, a second, reference station was launched.
The first station was positioned to “see” the entire sky, while the second is specifically shielded from the north and east. According to experts at Blue Dot Solutions, this allowed them to determine that the interference was not coming from the south or west. Both stations monitor signals on the two primary bands (L1 and L2) of all four GNSS constellations (GPS, GLONASS, GALILEO, and BEIDOU) and are located in Gdańsk at an elevation of approximately 100 meters above sea level.
Furthermore, data from the stations correspond with readings from, among other sources, the AIS system for identifying ship positions. During periods of interference, the positions of many ships around the southern Baltic Sea were clearly shifted from their actual locations. There were reports of vessels whose positions were recorded as being deep inland.
Below is an example of incorrect ship positions around the Kaliningrad Oblast, including marked positions of ships on land - an example from July 2026 / Credits – Blue Dot Solutions

Press release from Blue Dot Solutions.
Gdańsk, August 11, 2026. GPS/GNSS signal disruptions continue in Pomerania. In July 2026, disruptions occurred for at least 90 hours, affecting the operation of many systems in this region of Poland.
Satellite navigation has become so common that we don’t even notice how often we use it. GPS - or, more broadly, GNSS - allows us to plot a route from point A to point B, track a food delivery driver, or find the nearest electric scooter.
GNSS systems are also used in more advanced solutions, particularly in applications where operations are carried out without direct human intervention.
Although GNSS receivers are so widely used, they remain vulnerable to jamming and spoofing attacks. A single powerful attack can disrupt the operation of many independent systems. Our country has been experiencing this for several years, particularly in its northern and northeastern regions. The war in Ukraine, the tense geopolitical situation between Europe, Russia, and Belarus, and the close proximity to the Kaliningrad Oblast only facilitate attacks on GNSS infrastructure.
Falling drones or incorrect location data displayed on a phone are just a few examples of how attacks on GNSS affect everyday life. Deliberate attacks on GNSS by neighboring countries force local entities to respond.
Monitoring stations in Gdańsk
In response to such attacks, in May 2026, the Gdańsk-based technology company Blue Dot Solutions began work on implementing a network of stations to monitor GPS/GNSS signals. The first experimental station was set up that same month. Then, in June, a second, reference station was launched.
The first station was positioned to “see” the entire sky, while the second is specifically shielded from the north and east. According to experts at Blue Dot Solutions, this allowed them to determine that the interference was not coming from the south or west. Both stations monitor signals on the two primary bands (L1 and L2) of all four GNSS constellations (GPS, GLONASS, GALILEO, and BEIDOU) and are located in Gdańsk at an elevation of approximately 100 meters above sea level.
Furthermore, data from the stations correspond with readings from, among other sources, the AIS system for identifying ship positions. During periods of interference, the positions of many ships around the southern Baltic Sea were clearly shifted from their actual locations. There were reports of vessels whose positions were recorded as being deep inland.
Below is an example of incorrect ship positions around the Kaliningrad Oblast, including marked positions of ships on land - an example from July 2026 / Credits – Blue Dot Solutions

July 2026 – Summary of GPS/GNSS Disruptions
The incidents in July are very similar to those described in our reports from May and June 2026. In July, Blue Dot Solutions’ monitoring system detected:
- 17 incidents with a “probable” status,
- 6 incidents with a “possible” status.
They lasted 62 and 28.5 hours, respectively. They accounted for approximately 8.3% (probable) and approximately 3.8% (possible) of the total time for the month. In total, our stations recorded GPS/GNSS signal disruptions for over 12% of the time in July—nearly 90 hours. The July incidents typically began after 4:00 p.m. and ended by 8:00 a.m. Interestingly, most of these disruptions began after July 14. At that time, most of the attacks were also significantly longer.
The attacks were primarily directed at a single frequency band. The BDS team reports that 65% of the incidents affected the basic L1 band, 13% affected the more precise L2 band, while 22% of the attacks affected both bands. Based on this, it can be concluded that these attacks are primarily aimed at simple receivers used in phones or drones, as the L1 band is the primary band for most civilian equipment.
The Need for Extensive Jamming Monitoring
The company is not stopping at just two stations. In the second half of July, a third monitoring station was temporarily installed near Suwałki. Work is currently underway to launch another permanent station, the first one outside of Gdańsk. At a later date, the company also plans to install stations outside the country.
Creating an extensive network consisting of many receivers will allow the Blue Dot Solutions team not only to monitor jamming in real time, but also to determine the exact direction from which it originates.

More than a dozen serious incidents of GPS/GNSS signal jamming in May 2026

Gdansk, 2nd of June 2026. Blue Dot Solutions’ GPS/GNSS signal monitoring station detected several serious jamming incidents in May 2026. Some of them could have had a significant impact on the functioning of various systems in Pomerania, Poland.

For several years, the Pomeranian region, the southern Baltic region, and much of Poland have been grappling with increasingly frequent GPS/GNSS signal jamming and spoofing. There is virtually no doubt that the source of these jamming incidents is special military units located in the Königsberg Oblast.

The jamming has resulted in a growing number of problems and the partial or even complete inoperability of many devices and systems. GPS/GNSS signal jamming and spoofing no longer only impacts aviation and the military – the Polish Pomeranian region is seeing a rise in incidents affecting civilian operations. Problems with locating vehicles, including bicycles and city buses, are becoming increasingly common, as are loss of control of drones.

In May 2026, the Gdańsk-based company Blue Dot Solutions began regular monitoring of GPS/GNSS signal quality. The first station was installed in Gdańsk, at an altitude of approximately 100 meters above sea level. The selected installation site offers a good view of virtually the entire sky, particularly to the east. The first station monitors signal quality in the L1/G1/E1/B1 and L2/G2/E5/B2 bands for GNSS satellites. This first station is experimental, testing detection algorithms and implementing modifications and updates. Subsequent stations will monitor additional bands using these tested algorithms.

    Data acquired by Blue Dot Solutions GNSS interference monitoring system

    May 17, 2026

     

    Summary of GPS/GNSS jamming incidents in May 2026

    The first Blue Dot Solutions station monitored GPS/GNSS signal quality for 624 hours in May. This corresponds to 26 days of operations. The remaining time was spent on software improvements and testing, as well as updating server settings.


    During the entire measurement period, there were nine days when interference incidents were recorded. Most incidents occurred in the second half of May. Additionally, six days with a very high probability of GPS/GNSS signal interference were recorded.


    In May 2026, a total of at least 12 serious jamming incidents were identified. Most of them had very similar characteristics. The station typically records an increase in noise levels with a simultaneous increase in continuous wave attenuation and a decrease in signal gain. Typically, these attacks last between a few and dozen hours.


    In addition to “typical” GPS/GNSS jamming incidents, the team also detected several unusual incidents. The most serious occurred on May 21, 2026, when we recorded a very unusual increase in the transmitted signal strength on the L2/G2/E5/B2 band. This incident may have been an attempt to disrupt a British government official’s flight from Estonia to the UK. This event clearly demonstrates that intentional signal interference is not uniform and therefore difficult to detect uniformly.

     

      Continuous monitoring begins

      In the coming months, the Blue Dot Solutions team plans to install additional monitoring stations. This will allow us to compare incidents and detect instances of local interference with the GPS/GNSS signal. This type of jamming, while also common, is more difficult to detect.

      Intentional GNSS signal jamming is a significant problem affecting northern Poland. It affects the operation of public transport, rental cars, and taxis. Interference can also cause problems locating city bikes, which can sometimes be “found” in the Baltic Sea, even off the coast of the Königsberg Oblast. However, these are just clear examples of a very broad problem that our station can help identify and ultimately counteract.

      “This first station already demonstrates how sensitive our systems are to various types of GPS/GNSS signal jamming,” explains Dr. Krzysztof Kanawka, CEO of Blue Dot Solutions. “We’ve noticed a clear correlation between incidents and strange readings from digital systems. For example, in May, private users lost at least a dozen drones in Pomerania. What’s more, maps often showed local buses, trams, rental cars, and bicycles in the waters of the Bay of Gdańsk. These types of problems are just the tip of the iceberg – our task in the coming weeks is to connect jamming incidents with problems in digital systems.”

        Data acquired by Blue Dot Solutions GNSS interference monitoring system

        May 21, 2026

         

        Without the written consent of Blue Dot Solutions sp. z o.o., any form of processing, downloading, copying, or collecting data or information posted on this website is prohibited, including web scraping, web crawling, text and data mining (TDM) techniques. These activities also apply to the downloading and analysis of data, indexing of pages, and the use of content in an automated or manual manner, including for the development, construction, training, and improvement of software, machine learning systems, and artificial intelligence.
        The exception is activities that facilitate the functioning of search engines, enabling users and search engines to find the content of the website in the correct manner. All rights to the content and data are reserved.

        Zabronione są bez pisemnej zgody Blue Dot Solutions sp. z o.o. jakiekolwiek formy przetwarzania pobierania, kopiowania, gromadzenia danych lub informacji zamieszczonych na niniejszej stronie internetowej, wliczając w to techniki web scrapingu, web crawlingu, eksploracji tekstu i danych (TDM). Te działania także dotyczą pobieranie i analizę danych, indeksowanie stron, korzystanie z treści w sposób zautomatyzowany lub manualny, w tym dla rozwijania, budowania, szkolenia i poprawiania oprogramowania, systemów uczenia maszynowego oraz sztucznej inteligencji.
        Wyjątek stanowią działania służące do ułatwionego funkcjonowania wyszukiwarek internetowych, umożliwiające użytkownikom oraz wyszukiwarkom odnalezienie treści strony w prawidłowy sposób. Wszelkie prawa do treści i danych są zastrzeżone.